Resumo: O artigo foi apresentado como conferência no I Simpósio do Núcleo de Filosofia Kantiana Contemporânea "Zeljko Loparic", realizado na Universidade Estadual de Londrina, nos dias 17 e 18 de outubro de 2013. Trata-se de uma contribuição original e instigante para a filosofia política de inspiração kantiana, que se baseia, sobretudo, em textos da filosofia moral de Kant que não versam diretamente sobre política.
I. Introduction
By political authority I mean: the existence of a special group of people (a.k.a. government), with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the content of these commands might be, and in particular, even if these commands and/or the coercion are morally impermissible.
By coercion I mean:
Kant e-Prints. Campinas, Série 2, v. 9, n. 1, p.01-26 jan.-jun., 2014 we understand the last sentence of "What is Enlightenment?" as it truly ought to be understood, namely as formulating a vision of radical enlightenment: 3 When nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell [of the "crooked timber of humanity" (IUH 8: 23) ], the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity. To be sure, neither the term 'existentialism' nor the term 'anarchism' existed until the 
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6 Kant e-Prints. Campinas, Série 2, v. 9, n. 1, p.01-26 jan.-jun., 2014 I fully realize that even when it has been helpfully reduced to an acronym, EKCA is still rather a mouthful. So what, more precisely, do I mean by "existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchism"?
1. By existential, 8 I mean the primitive motivational, or "internalist," normative ground of the philosophical and political doctrine I want to defend, which is the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed life not essentially based on egoistic, hedonistic, or consequentialist (e.g., utilitarian) interests, a.k.a. the desire for selftranscendence, while at the same time fully assuming the natural presence-a.k.a. the facticity-of all such instrumental interests in our "human, all too human" lives. In a word, the existential ideal of a rational human wholehearted autonomous life is the ideal of authenticity.
2. By Kantian, I mean the primitive objective, or "externalist," normative ground of the philosophical and political doctrine I want to defend, which is the recognition that the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed, non-egoistic, nonhedonistic, non-consequentialist life, which I call the desire for self-transcendence, can be sufficiently rationally justified only in so far as it is also a life of principled authenticity, by which I mean principled wholehearted autonomy, or having a good will in Kant's sense, guided by respect for the dignity of all real persons, 9 under the Categorical Imperative.
3. By cosmopolitan, 10 I mean that this philosophical and political doctrine recognizes
States (e.g., nation-States) as actual brute past and contemporary facts, but also requires our choosing and acting in such a way that we reject in thought, and perhaps also reject and resist in words and/or actions, any immoral commands, limitations, restrictions, and prejudices present in any contemporary States, especially including the one (or ones, in my case, Canada and the USA) we happen to be citizens or members of, and regard ourselves instead as It is particularly to be noted that the conjunction of 1., 2., and 3. is only accidentally consistent with, and very frequently sharply at odds with, both the theory and also the practices of contemporary large-scale capitalism, especially in its globalizing manifestations. institutions, is that they fully satisfy the moral requirements under 1., 2., and 3. Otherwise, resistance, subversion, or even outright civil disobedience is at the very least permissible, and possibly also required.
It is also particularly to be noted that the conjunction of 1. through 4. rules out the possibility that "the single moral world-community of real persons, The Real Realm of Ends," mentioned under 3., could ever permissibly take the form of either a league of States or a world-State, assuming that these also claim political authority and actually possess the power to coerce. Let me now spell out the basic ideas of EKCA again somewhat more fully.
According to existential Kantian ethics, a.k.a. EKE, 13 the highest or supreme good is a good will in Kant's sense (GMM 4:393) (CPrR 5: 110); and a good will in Kant's sense is the self-consciously experienced realization, at least partially and to some degree, of our innate capacity for autonomy, i.e., our innate capacity for free moral self-legislation, insofar as it is also inherently combined with an innate capacity for wholeheartedness, in this fully natural and thoroughly nonideal actual world. Otherwise put, self-consciously-experiencedautonomy-with-wholeheartedness-in-this-fully-natural-and-thoroughly-nonideal-actual-world is nothing more and nothing less than a rational human minded animal or real human person who is choosing and acting freely, on principle, and with a passionate and yet Stoic commitment, for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, a.k.a. the moral law. The selfconscious experience of our own at-least-partially-realized capacity for autonomy carries with it a deep happiness, or "self-fulfillment" (Selbstzufriedenheit) (CPrR 5: 117), aptly characterized by Kant-who clearly has the Stoic notion of ataraxia in mind-as a negative satisfaction in one's own existence, which also strongly anticipates what the existentialists later called authenticity, and consists, in the ideal case, of the self-conscious experience of the perfect coherence and self-sufficiency of all one's own desires, beliefs, cognitions, inferences, intentions, motivating reasons, and choices in the act of autonomous willing. To choose and act in this way to any extent is, to that extent, to have thereby achieved principled authenticity (i.e., principled wholehearted autonomy, or a "good will" in Kant's sense), at least partially and to some degree. Or otherwise put, to choose and act in this way is to have reached or exceeded the highest possible bar, standard, or ideal of rational normativity for rational human minded animals, and indeed for any other actual or possible creatures essentially like us, whether or not they are human.
This fundamental axiological thesis about the good will can be directly compared and contrasted with that of ethical egoism, which says that the highest good is individual selfinterest (whether this self-interest is specifically narcissistic/self-loving, selfish/self-inflating, or hedonistic/pleasure-seeking, or not), and also with that of act consequentialism, which says that the highest good is choosing and acting with good results. Now ethical egoism (including 13 See Hanna, Kantian Ethics and Human Existence.
but not restricted to hedonism) and act consequentialism can both be consistently combined with classical eudaimonism, which says that the highest good is human happiness- More precisely, The State-in-itself, the supposed Really Real ground and source of human social existence and political authority, with the power and the right to command and to coerce people to obey its commands as a duty, even if these commands and/or the coercion are impermissible according to basic existential Kantian moral principles-just like God, the supposed Really Real ground of worldly, creaturely existence and morality, namely a superhuman entity with the power and the right to command and to coerce people to obey its commands as a duty, even if these commands and/or the coercion are impermissible according to basic existential Kantian moral principles-is nothing but a noumenal or transcendental abstraction in the Kantian sense, a mere "thought-entity" or Verstandeswesen.
If Kant's radical agnosticism about things-in-themselves or noumena is correct, then it follows that the existence or non-existence of The State-in-itself, like God, is knowably unknowable, and its nature, were it to exist, is also knowably unknowable.
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Now the non-existence of the mythical State-in-itself is the mythical Hobbesian stateof-nature, and it is just as philosophically fallacious to think that if God were to fail to exist (the dark night of atheism), then everything would be permitted in a moral sense (the chaos of nihilism), as it is to think that if the State-in-itself were to fail to exist (the dark night of the Hobbesian state-of-nature), then everything would be permitted in a political sense (the chaos of "the war of all against all"). Correspondingly, it is just as philosophically fallacious to use the mythical bogeyman of "the war of all against all" as a sufficient reason for believing in the necessity of a State-in-itself, as it is to use the mythical bogeyman of nihilism as a sufficient reason for believing in the necessity of God's existence. Theism is to statism, as atheism is to the belief in a Hobbesian state-of-nature lurking behind the paper-thin façade of civil society.
All are equally rationally unsupported and illusory. this is really possible, by means of our wholehearted autonomous constructive activity. Every time an agent truly chooses or acts for the sake of the Categorical Imperative/moral law, she thereby actualizes or realizes moral worth, and she thereby experiences autonomous selffulfillment, at least partially or to some degree. But if she also thereby achieves some individual and also communal or social happiness, then she also realizes a proper part of the complete good, and partially actualizes or realizes The Realm of Ends in this "human, all too human" world, at least partially or to some degree. Given "the crooked timber of humanity" in this thoroughly nonideal world, which is a timber that "can never be made straight" (IUH 8:
23) and which is a world in which, it seems, as they say, no good deed ever goes unpunished, however, then the complete good is not humanly possible to any degree or any extent unless 
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Second, according to ECKA, destructive ludic mayhem, revolutionism, and terrorism are all strictly inconsistent with respecting the dignity of real persons, and with choosing and acting for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, and thus are morally impermissible.
Third, according to ECKA, the use of physical force or the threat of physical force within an anarchist social framework is morally permissible only for the purposes of (i) self-defense against primary coercion, especially life-threatening primary coercion,
(ii) protecting the innocent and the weak from primary coercion, especially lifethreatening primary coercion, and (iii) preventing direct violations of rational human dignity.
Moreover, only the use of minimal, last-resort self-defensive, protective, and preventative physical force is morally permissible. Within the scope of "morally good-making, environmentally-sound, non-coercive, non-compulsive bottom-up and top-down social institutions or structures" I mean to include, e.g., flourishing families and intimate adult partnerships of all kinds 19 ; hospitals and universal healthcare; schools and colleges; humanistic and scientific communities of free inquiry, a.k.a., post-universities; fine arts and everyday arts, and crafts; private and public entertainment; sports and games; small-scale, eco-sensitive agriculture, public forestry, and public parkcultivation; small-scale capitalism with universal social security; and trains that run on time.
As such, EKCA is neither anarcho-capitalist, insofar as unconstrained large-scale capitalism is immoral, nor anarcho-socialist, insofar as authoritarian and/or totalitarian socialism is also Therefore, again, as I am understanding it, the problem of political authority is this:
Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of any special group of people (a.k.a. government) with the power to coerce, and the right to command other people and to coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, no matter what the content of these commands might be, and in particular, even if these commands and/or the coercion are morally impermissible?
And again, by the State I mean:
any social organization that not only claims political authority, but also actually possesses the power to coerce, in order to secure and sustain this authority.
Therefore, as before, by the problem of political authority I also mean:
Is there an adequate rational justification for the existence of the State or any other State-like institution?
This problem applies directly to all kinds of political authority, States, and State-like institutions, from pharaohs, kings, and popes, to constitutional monarchies, communist States, capitalist liberal democracies, provincial or city governments, military organizations, business corporations, and universities-basically, any institution with its own army or police-force.
But of course the problem is not just philosophical, it is all too horribly real. Since the 19 th century, States, especially nation-States, and other State-like institutions have explicitly claimed to possess political authority, and then have proceeded to use the power to coerce, especially the power of primary coercion, frequently of the most awful, cruel, and monstrous kinds, thereby repressing, detaining, imprisoning, enslaving, torturing, starving, maiming, or killing literally hundreds of millions of people, in order to secure their acceptance of these authoritarian claims. Even allowing for all the other moral and natural evils that afflict humankind, it seems very likely that there has never been a single greater cause of evil, misery, suffering, and death in the history of the world than the coercive force of States and other State-like institutions.
As I also noted in section I, the thesis of philosophical anarchism says that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or any other State-like institutions, and the thesis of political anarchism says that we should construct a world in which there are no States or other State-like institutions. On the one hand, it is rationally coherent and permissible to defend philosophical anarchism without also defending political anarchism. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how one could rationally justify political anarchism except by way of philosophical anarchism. So philosophical anarchism is the rational key to anarchism more generally, although of course political anarchism is ultimately where all the real-world action is.
Although I want to defend both philosophical anarchism and also political anarchism, from an existential Kantian cosmopolitan point of view, this is not the place to take on the
strenuous task of fully justifying political anarchism. Instead, here is what I take to be a selfevidently sound five-step argument for philosophical anarchism, which I will call the core Kantian argument for philosophical anarchism:
(1) We adopt, as basic moral principles, by means of which we can judge the permissibility or impermissibility of any human choice, action, practical policy, or other practical principle, the set of basic Kantian moral principles.
(2) Precisely insofar as it is morally impermissible for individual real persons or groups of real persons to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, then by the same token, it must also be morally impermissible for special groups of people inside States or other State-like institutions, a.k.a.
governments, to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty.
(3) Therefore, precisely insofar as it is morally impermissible for individual real persons or groups of real persons to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, even if governments have the power to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands, nevertheless governments do not have the right to command other people and coerce them to obey those commands as a duty.
(4) But all governments claim political authority in precisely this sense.
(5) Therefore, there is no adequate rational justification for political authority, States, or other State-like institutions, and philosophical anarchism is true.
Or in other and fewer words, because there is no adequate rational justification, according to the set of basic Kantian moral principles, for an individual real person's, or any group of real persons', immorally commanding other people and coercing them to obey those commands as a duty, yet the very idea of political authority entails that special groups of people within
States or State-like institutions, namely governments, have not only the power to coerce, but also the right to command other people and to coerce them to obey those commands as a duty, even when the commands and/or coercion are immoral, then it follows that there is no One possible explanation for the almost universal failure to recognize the truth of philosophical anarchism is that most people, including most political philosophers, are subject to a complex and powerful psychological illusion-the illusion of political authority-that interferes with and undermines the proper employment of their rational capacities, and thus makes it extremely difficult for them to recognize what is otherwise rationally self-evident.
And I do think that this is indeed the case. One everyday example of this complex and powerful psychological illusion is the more or less spine-chilling spectatorial horror we feel when we watch post-apocalyptic movies, directed to the mythic Hobbesian "war of all against all" (often reminiscent of Hollywood depictions of the Wild West, only even more chaotic and gory) that is depicted as following from the breakdown of State-order, yet feel no disgust or horror whatsoever about the horrendous State-system that must have led to the fictional apocalypse.
But I also think that there is a deeper Kantian explanation, namely, that most people, especially including most political philosophers, are subject to a complex and powerful philosophical illusion-the noumenal or transcendental illusion of The State-in-itself and its equally illusory dialectical contrary, the Hobbesian state-of-nature-that makes it extremely difficult for them to see the self-evident truth of philosophical anarchism.
Here, then, is where Kant's radical agnosticism can be smoothly extended and added to the five-step core Kantian argument for philosophical anarchism, as follows:
(6) Nevertheless, there is almost universal belief in the political authority of governments, States, and other State-like institutions.
(7) Part of the explanation for the almost universal failure to recognize that there is no adequate rational justification for political authority is that most people, including most political philosophers, are subject to a complex and powerful psychological illusion-the illusion of political authority-that makes it extremely difficult for them to recognize the self-evident truth of philosophical anarchism. (10) Kant's radical agnosticism undermines this philosophical illusion, and makes it possible to see the rationally self-evident truth of philosophical anarchism.
This argument-strategy, in turn, has a special advantage over other existing arguments for philosophical anarchism that proceed by, first, enumerating, criticizing, and rejecting a finite number of candidates (say, divine right of kings, social contract theory, democracy, and rule consequentialism) for providing sufficient rational justification for political authority, then, second, critically attacking the psychological illusion of political authority, and then, 27 In conversation, Føllesdal has said to me that "we're probably on the same team." Of course, I wouldn't want to saddle him with a commitment to EKCA. I think he meant only that, at the end of the day, we have similar views about the moral and rational justification of Federalism.
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Kant e-Prints. Campinas, Série 2, v. 9, n. 1, p.01-26 jan.-jun., 2014 institutions, by means of which we voluntarily turn ourselves into more or less wellserviced machines, and on the other hand, the guiding moral ideal of an existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarchist post-State world.
(9) In this way, then, Kantian ethical anarchists can also be quasi-Federalists.
(10) And now, with one other editorial addition, we can also re-quote Kant's vision of radical enlightement:
When [after a long devolutionary Federalist process] nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell [of the "crooked timber of humanity" (IUH 8: 23)], the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity. 28 28 I am very grateful to the participants in the workshop "Philosophical Foundations of Federalism," at the University of Luxembourg, LU, in May 2014, and especially Andreas Føllesdal, for extremely helpful critical comments on an earlier version of this essay, and equally helpful conversations on or around its central topics.
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